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Ogyû Sorai, Matsudaira Sadanobu and 
the Kansei Worship of Confucius
It is an honour to be invited to Kokushikan University. I am grateful to the personal good 
offices of Professor Eiji Takemura, a scholar who, with his writing in both Japanese and 
English,  has made a notable contribution to historical understanding of thought in 
nineteenth-century Japan. I would like also to thank Professor Kate Nakai for her kind 
words of introduction.＊1 
Introduction
Ogyû Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728) must be the most studied of Japanese Confucian thinkers. 
Today, I wish to look at his thought through its influence on practice, to explore, and to attempt to 
identify, its impact on an important episode in later Tokugawa period history, the Kansei 寛政 
Reform (1787-1800)＊2.  I shall be concerned not with the reform as a whole, but with one 
particular aspect: the reform and revival of the cult of Confucius. Sorai’s thought was in great part 
practical rather than speculative in spirit. It was intended to be the basis for an intervention in the 
society of his own time, and it is reasonable to enquire into how it was applied in practice. I shall 
be concerned with a major figure of some hundred years after Sorai, Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定
信 (1758-1829), whose leadership and implementation of the important Kansei Reform was, I shall 
endeavour to argue, deeply influenced by Sorai. Intellectual influence, unless openly and explicitly 
acknowledged, is hard to demonstrate. Such evidence as I shall produce today is in part 
circumstantial. The argument put forward here is cautious; it might perhaps better be described as 
an exploration than a claim.
As all with a basic knowledge of Japanese history will know, this is, at first sight at least, a 
paradoxical argument. As it is surely unnecessary to remind you, the Kansei Reform is associated 
with the well-known ‘Kansei prohibition on heterodoxy’ (Kansei igaku no kin 寛政異学の禁 ), a 
measure which established Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) Neo-Confucianism as the exclusive orthodoxy 
of  the Shôheizaka gakumonjo 昌平坂学問所 (hereafter called the ‘Bakufu College’) in 1790. It is 
claimed that the prohibition was motivated by the desire to suppress the influence of Sorai. Sorai 
himself, moreover, was very critical of Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, and, on the surface of it, would 
seem unlikely ever to have approved its choice as an official orthodoxy. Here is indeed a paradox. 
How is it possible to interpret as ‘influence’ a measure that flatly contradicts the declared 
preferences of the figure to whom the influence is attributed?
To explore this paradox will necessitate excursions into two different fields: first, briefly, the 
thought of Sorai himself;  and then, at greater length, the historical reform of the final decade of 
the eighteenth century. I should also add that I shall be focussing on one particular aspect, albeit 
arguably the most symbolic and important one, of the reform. Chronologically, this came last, in 
1800: it was the liturgical reform or reconstruction of the ceremony to venerate Confucius, the 
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sekiten 釋奠 (also referred to as sekisai 釋菜 ; in Chinese these terms are read as shidian and shicai 
respectively) ceremony. I shall be returning to this subject in just a moment. 
Ogyû Sorai
First, however, let me say that, as a latecomer to intensive study of his thought,  I am diffident 
over talking about Sorai in front of experts. He is a thinker of great erudition and subtlety, whose 
thought really requires a lifetime even to begin to understand adequately and without fear of 
distortion. However, he is also the most prominent of the Tokugawa Confucians. Indeed, I believe 
that there have been more than 200 scholarly books and articles on him in the last few decades. He 
has attracted the scholarly interest of some of the most brilliant Japanese scholars since the war. 
No one seriously interested in Tokugawa intellectual history can ignore his presence or deny his 
historical importance. He is also claimed to have exerted an abiding influence on modern Japanese 
political thought.
Sorai is a brilliant thinker. His achievements are justly celebrated. Part of his intention was to 
historicize Confucian social and political institutions, to argue that they were human creations 
addressed to particular historical situations. In practice, as commentators, including the great 
Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男 have noted, this could undermine their authority. It is this aspect of 
Sorai’s ideas that I want to explore tonight with reference to the Kansei Reform. But before 
looking at this episode, it is useful first to consider the general character of Sorai’s thought and 
more particularly his attitude to the religious aspect of Confucianism. After consideration of his 
work, especially his Rongo chô 論語徴 , I came to the conclusion that Sorai’s is what might  be 
called an ‘authoritarian managerial utilitarian’. He consolidated a view of morality found 
elsewhere in East Asian moral thought: Sorai, it can be argued, took what philosophers call a 
‘consequentialist’ view of ethics. That is to say that actions were good not because they were 
intrinsically so, but because they produced good consequences. This led him to the view that acts 
are moral that bring benefit, or contentment, or at least an absence of anxiety, to people; and the 
more people so benefited, the more effective, morally speaking, the action. This is recognisable as 
the view of morality characteristic of those philosophers in the west commonly called 
‘utilitarians’. They believe in the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’. This might at first 
seem an attractive and persuasive view of morality, but there is of course a downside. If acts have 
no moral status in themselves, any act, even an apparently destructive one by conventional 
standards, as long as it produces appropriate happiness, is ‘good’. 
In Sorai’s thought we find that the Confucian virtues such as benevolence are artificial 
creations by men of great wisdom, invented to maximise peace and contentment. Conversely, even 
the taking of human life may be considered good. Lies and manipulations on the part of those in 
authority are also acceptable in principle, provided that their consequences are good. Apparent 
inconsistencies also do not matter. Sorai believed that religious worship was of this kind; it was 
instituted by men of wisdom to procure the desired end of the happiness of the greatest number. 
The worship of spirits, quite aside from whether they really existed or not, was a ‘technique’ 
(jutsu 術 ), or, to give it a pejorative nuance in English, a ‘manipulation’.
The utilitarian or consequentialist view stands in contrast to what philosophers call the 
‘deontological’ view, which holds that actions are right in themselves. The latter belief, it is fairly 
obvious, will be characteristic of most religious morality. It was certainly true of the prevailing 
form of Confucianism of Sorai’s day, usually called Neo-Confucianism. This tradition held that the 
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Confucian virtues such as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and good faith, 
were binding because they were a part of the structure of the world; they were eternal and 
invariant. Moreover, they were part of the natural order, and they were thus also part of human 
nature. What was necessary was for men to discover and act out these moral imperatives in their 
family and social lives. If they did so, a harmonious and happy society would be achieved, and 
nature itself would function harmoniously.
Sorai was, as is generally known, highly critical of the Neo-Confucianist doctrines of the 
relationship of morality to the natural order; its soteriology or imperative to self cultivation. Its 
goal of self realization through self cultivation was, he believed, impracticable and mistaken. Sorai 
was particularly critical of the place of Mencius (Môshi 孟子 ; 371-289 BCE) in Neo-Confucian 
teaching. From Sorai’s point of view, Mencius was a negative influence on the development of the 
tradition. His concept of the individual as capable of making his own subjective judgements was a 
misunderstanding of the true nature of the tradition. The result was a teaching that encouraged 
unrealistic views; it promoted disputaciousness and arbitrary judgements. It could not promote the 
disciplined unity of society that Sorai considered desirable. The true Confucian way, he 
proclaimed, consisted not of self-cultivation in pursuit of an illusory goal, but of objective 
institutions enforced by political authority. These institutions had been created by men of 
superordinate ability in ancient China. The minds of these men were inaccessible to posterity, save 
to a small elite minority, those qualified by status to govern. Upon them fell the charge of 
implementing effective administration, if necessary by coercion, and achieving the utilitarian goal 
of contentment. To this end, in true utilitarian fashion, manipulations such as the use of 
superstition as a means to social control, were acceptable. Here lay the origin of the elite and 
authoritarian aspect of Sorai’s political theory.
The  sekiten
Sorai’s scepticism concerning the Confucian practice of his times influenced his approach to 
the religious aspect of the tradition as it was observed among his contemporaries. Here, it is 
possible that the locution ‘the religious aspect of the tradition’ may occasion some surprise. 
Confucianism is usually considered rational and weak in terms of the supernatural and 
metaphysical. Indeed, when the Jesuits encountered Confucian religious ceremonies in China in 
the c16th and c17th, they interpreted the ritual to honour Confucius to be a secular expression of 
gratitude and honour. Indeed, certainly, up until very recently, this aspect of Confucianism, 
particularly in the West, has been largely underestimated by historians and scholars. 
In fact,  the sekiten was a very important element in the history of  Confucianism throughout 
East Asia. It was the main visible and institutional expression of the tradition that many 
encountered. This ceremony, again rather little studied in modern times until very recently, was 
important in the Confucian world in Tokugawa Japan. It was, of course, like Confucianism itself, 
Chinese in origin. As a ritual, it had certain unusual properties that reflected the rational character 
of the tradition that it sought to sacralize. In technical terms, it was not petitionary; that is it sought 
no overt sublunary rewards; nor was it expiatory or apotropaeic, seeking to ward off calamity or 
injury. It was not soteriological, offering the promise of personal salvation in another world. 
Rather, it was primarily a communal, albeit elite, expression of gratitude to the sage Confucius and 
others in the tradition for their teachings. In its grandest versions, as for instance when the emperor 
himself or crown prince sacrificed, it reconciled potentially divergent or conflicting elements with 
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in the Chinese polity: autocratic monarchy and rational bureaucracy. It also sacralized the project 
of Confucian education and the values that underpinned it: a certain belief in the equality, or 
equality of potential, of all men; the ideal of good administration by men of virtue, their authority 
delegated to those similarly of virtue and talent, selected and promoted on the basis of their merit. 
Because the ceremony embodied these Confucian values, it may be claimed that the religious 
worship of Confucius in the form of this ceremony represents a kind of test of the commitment to 
the Confucian tradition.  Authoritative performance of the ceremony constituted an 
acknowledgement of the authority of the Confucian world view and, naturally, with that, the 
imperative force of Confucian ethics and the validity of the Confucian view of the individual.
This ritual had originated relatively late in Chinese history. The ceremony derived its 
structure from ancient Chinese ritual procedures, but as a rite to venerate Confucius was first 
recorded only in the Han 漢 dynasty. It received a classic formulation in the Tang 唐 , in the official 
version of the ceremony prescribed in the great ritual compendium, the Kaiyuan li 開元礼 , of 732. 
In this phase of its development, the ceremony may be subsumed into what the anthropologist 
Catherine Bell, a modern scholar of ritual, calls the ‘cosmological ordering’ type of rite, which 
tends to be associated with the claim to power of a large-scale with a ‘central monarchical figure’＊3. 
This version of the ceremony was to continue to be observed, with a tendency to exalt the status of 
Confucius liturgically, throughout the history of imperial China. Indeed, there was even at one 
time a move to grant him the posthumous status of emperor. This, again, was to arouse Sorai’s 
indignation
Some centuries later, even as the ‘cosmological ordering’ version of the ceremony was 
perpetuated, but as Confucianism itself evolved in China, the sekiten developed in a different 
direction, to become unofficial and personal. The  Song Neo-Confucian revival proclaimed a 
‘Way’ that was concerned with ‘cultivating an internalized moral universe emphasizing 
intentionality and its expression in action’＊4.  Moreover, it is important to stress that, under 
Buddhist influence, it offered deep spiritual rewards, a Confucian version of enlightenment, to its 
followers. Its great synthesizer, Zhu Xi, drew up a liturgy that stressed the observers’ personal 
devotion to the founder of the tradition. In Bell’s typology, his version of the ceremony belongs to 
the ‘ethical-moral’ phase of ritual development. In this type, ‘the major form of religious action is 
ethical and disciplinary in nature’, here, however, with an added soteriological dimension. This 
was a quite different form of Confucian religiosity from that of the classic Tang ceremony for the 
crown prince.  Zhu’s version is usually called a sekisai, because of its smaller scale and possibly 
also because the offerings were mainly vegetable. It has liturgical features that reflect the intention 
to legitimize, or to sacralize, his particular interpretation of the tradition associated with the 
Mencian and Neo-Confucian branch of Confucianism. It achieved this by incorporating the leading 
figures of that tradition, particularly  Mencius, Zi Si 子思 (Confucius’ grandson; probably fourth 
century BCE; author of the  Doctrine of the Mean [zhong yong 中庸 ]), and others including Zhu’s 
immediate forerunners in the Neo-Confucian revival, into the liturgy, as so-called ‘correlates’ (hai 
配 ) or ‘subsidiary venerands’ (jûshi 従祀 ). This, of course, was precisely the branch of the 
tradition that Sorai excoriated. It will be necessary to return to this theme later in the lecture.
In Japan, the ceremony was adopted, along with other institutions of Tang China, in the eighth 
century. It was observed both in the ancient and medieval periods, and gain, after a hiatus in the 
sixteenth century, in the Tokugawa period.  Its history in Japan is a matter of absorbing interest, 
and the subject of my own research for some years now. In general, my view has been that history 
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demonstrates first that this ceremony tended to flourish most when it was associated with broader 
aspects of Chinese culture and with social, as opposed to purely religious, political or ideological 
functions; when it activated the Sinophile cultural reflexes that had always been characteristic of 
elite Japanese society. In other words, its original purpose, to sacralize the Confucian tradition 
through veneration of its founder, tended to be skewed in the direction of cultural and aesthetic 
values. Second, in a complementary trend, the worship of Confucius competed with other 
traditions and value systems. Its history in Japan shows that  was not always successful in this 
competition.  
Thus in ancient Japan, the ‘cosmological ordering’ version of the ceremony flourished to a 
certain extent at the imperial court and among the high aristocracy in the Nara and Heian periods. 
However, its popularity was achieved partly by its association with the feasting and verse 
composition that followed the sacrifice itself. The actual religious ceremony dwindled in 
importance. It became a ritual largely ignored by high authority, participation confined to men of 
low hereditary rank. The history of Confucian liturgy Japan was self referential, and it will be 
necessary, again, to return to this version of the ceremony later, in the context of Matsudaira 
Sadanobu’s revival of the ancient ceremony. 
The ceremony finally lapsed after the Ônin 応仁 wars (1467-77), but was revived during the 
early Tokugawa period, by the Hayashi 林 lineage in their school, the semi-official Shôheikô 昌平
黌 in Edo, and by others, both as an ‘unofficial’ ritual in  shijuku 私塾 and as an unofficial or semi-
official ceremony in domain schools hankô 藩校＊5.  Initially, Zhu Xi’s ‘ethical-moral’ unofficial 
version was popular, partly for reasons of scale, partly precisely because of its unofficial character. 
But some Japanese Confucian scholars, for instance the influential commoner Nakamura Tekisai 
中村惕斎 (1629-1702), certainly emphasized its devotional aspect. As practised by the Hayashi at 
the Shôheikô, the ceremony, initially referred to as a  sekisai, assumed a particular form: it adopted 
and adapted the liturgy of Zhu Xi’s unofficial version,  but was also influenced by the liturgies that 
had developed in ancient Japan, including lecturing after the ceremony and the composition of 
verses. None the less, it symbolized the commitment of the Hayashi lineage to the Zhu Xi school 
of Confucianism. Liturgically, the Hayashi ceremony naturally enough represented Confucius as 
the principal object of worship, but honoured, as well as Confucius himself, his favourite disciple 
Yan Hui 顔回 , Zeng zi 曾子 (Confucius’ son-in-law), Zi Si, whose text,  The Doctrine of the Mean, 
was strongly criticised, together with Mencius, by Sorai for privileging individual subjectivity. 
Even more important, it also venerated  as  jûshi or ‘subsidiary venerands’, six Song Dynasty 
Neo-Confucian subsidiary venerands , major figures in the Neo-Confucian movement (Chou 
Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017-73), the two Cheng 程 brothers, Mingdao 明道 (1032-86) and Yichuan 伊川 
(1033-1107), Zhang Zai 張載 (1021-77), Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011-77), and Zhu Xi himself. The 
Hayashi liturgy thus unambiguously proclaimed the ceremony as sacralizing the Neo-Confucian 
interpretation of the tradition. Institutionally, the semi-official status of the school  also associated 
Song Neo-Confucianism with the bakufu 幕府 itself. The representatives of this tradition were 
included, along with Confucius himself, in the climactic phase in the liturgy of the  sekiten 
ceremony. This was the reading of the  shukubun 祝文 or ‘invocation’, when the spirit of 
Confucius was directly addressed in high-flown language:
O king, your virtue pervades Heaven and Earth; your Way transcends past and present; you 
compiled the Six Classics; you bequeathed a pattern for ten thousand generations. 
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Respectfully, with a banner of silk and fermented wine, with grain filling the various vessels, 
I offer the ancient sacrifices and set forth the bright offerings.＊6
The prayer goes on explicitly to mention the spirits of the four correlates (Yan Hui, Zeng Zi, 
Zi Si and Mencius), together with the six Song dynasty Neo-Confucian subsidiary venerands 
mentioned above.  Again, it will be useful to bear in mind that Sorai was deeply hostile to this 
tradition.
This ritual had had an uneven history in the early and middle Tokugawa period. It was 
promoted by followers of the tradition, anxious to advance Confucianism in a world massively 
dominated by Buddhism, as a very important and visible symbol of their persuasion. Initially slow 
to be adopted on a large scale or to attract firm state patronage, it had been flamboyantly and 
grandiosely sponsored by the fifth shogun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉 (r. 1680-1709) during 
the Genroku 元禄 period. Tsunayoshi funded the construction of a grand shrine in Edo, the 
forerunner of the present Yushima Sage’s Hall 湯島聖堂 opposite the Ochanomizu 御茶の水 
station. It, or more precisely, as in the ancient period,  the feast and poetry composition that 
followed it, became a popular event in the Edo elite feudal social world, attracting a full house of 
daimyo and their dependants. It reached even greater, albeit narrower, heights in the reign of the 
sixth shogun, Tokugawa Ienobu 徳川家宣 (r. 1709-12). Under the tutelage of Arai Hakuseki 新井白
石 (1657-1725), Ienobu himself performed the libation to Confucius. However, the eighth shogun, 
Yoshimune 吉宗 (r. 1716-45), reacted sternly against what he perceived as the extravagance of the 
immediately preceding shogunal reigns and withdrew much financial support for the sekiten. He 
himself never once visited the Confucian shrine.  
Sorai’s views on the sekiten
At this point we should note that Sorai himself, as a Confucian scholar, was naturally familiar 
with the sekiten ceremony. As we have suggested, he also had a special attitude towards the 
worship of spirits, an aspect of the tradition to which he applied his radical utilitarianism. He 
believed the spirits to have been created, or at least their existence endorsed, by sages for social 
and political purposes.  Superficially, he might have been expected to be favorably disposed to the 
sekiten, given his belief in ritual institutions and in the instrumental, utilitarian uses of spirit 
worship. However, Sorai absolutized the legacy of the ‘former kings’ who had preceded 
Confucius, and his thought, while always respectful of Confucius himself, did not number him 
among the great ‘creator sages’.  Sorai was certainly aware that the sekiten to honour Confucius in 
the form practised in both China and Japan was not an institution of these ancient sages and had 
little ancient authority. In his early thought, he seems to have approved of the ceremony in 
principle, though he found serious fault in its contemporary practice. In his Ken’en jippitsu 蘐園十
筆 , dated by Professor Hiraishi Naoaki 平石直昭 to around 1716, he explored the principles behind 
veneration of Confucius in some detail. The arguments for worshipping Confucius, Sorai believed, 
had been ‘confused’. Probably reacting against the grandiosity of Tsunayoshi’s Genroku rite, Sorai 
particularly objected to the posthumous ennoblement of Confucius and others in the tradition. 
There were properly three axes of honour:  age, virtue and nobility.
Confucius is honored for his virtue. This is why he is regarded as their teacher by the 
emperors and kings of the ten thousand generations, so why should he borrow [a title of] 
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nobility? Properly he should be designated as ‘the former sage Confucius’. Thus not to confer 
enfeoffments and posthumous titles on him is correct.＊7
Not only were Confucius’ modern titles misconceived and inflated, Sorai also attacked as 
‘presumptuous’ the practice of later ages of conferring titles of nobility on other venerands in the 
ceremony, ‘duke’ 公 on the four correlates and ‘feudal prince’ 侯 on the ten savants . He wished 
also to reduce the number of additional venerands. Compared to the established Hayashi 
observance, this represented a shift away from the liturgical prominence given to the Mencian and 
Neo-Confucian traditions, for the ‘Six Gentlemen of Song’ are not identified separately as jûshi. 
Though Sorai’s list was up to date in Chinese terms, the general emphasis was closer to ancient, 
pre-Song, Tang versions of the ceremony, before the development of Neo-Confucianism and the 
rediscovery and privileging of Mencius as a key figure in the development and transmission of the 
Confucian Way.
However, by the time of his full intellectual maturity, Sorai seems to have grown more critical 
of the contemporary tradition of Confucius worship. Just as he cut down the figure of Confucius 
himself to that of a fallible, time-bound human being, so he seemed in his Benmei 辨名 of ca. 1720 
to stop short of specifically endorsing Confucius himself as an appropriate object of sacrifice. He 
wrote of the sekiten as applying to the ‘seven creator sages’, ‘Yao 堯 Shun 舜 , Yu 禹 , Tang 湯 , 
Wen 文 , Wu 武 and the duke of Zhou 周公 ’. ‘The rites music, administration and teachings that 
they created are what the superior man learns. Therefore, he sacrifices to them in schools’; and he 
quoted a text from the ancient Chinese  Book of Rites (Raiki 禮記 ) enjoining offerings to ‘earlier 
sages and earlier teachers’ at the opening of a school.＊8  Moreover, Sorai was critical of the recent 
and contemporary Rinke 林家 regimen at Shôheizaka. He noted the enthusiasm of the fifth shogun 
for learning, but linked it to the fashion for ‘lectures’ which he described as ‘profitless’.  He 
related ‘lectures’ to the contemporary Bakufu Confucians, whom he condemned. ‘Most of them 
are of no use to the shogun’＊9.  And he seems also to have associated ‘lectures’ historically to the 
sekiten itself.＊10   Thus the most powerful Confucian mind of the period criticized the current 
practice of the rite and sought to modify it both in accordance with his own radical assumptions on 
the nature of Confucianism and possibly also to accommodate the retrenchment policies of the 
eighth shogun.
Let us now summarize the themes of this talk so far: we have discussed Ogyû Sorai, his 
Confucianism and view of spirit worship; and we glanced at the worship of Confucius as an 
important element of Confucianism and at Sorai’s criticism of its contemporary practice. We can 
say that for Sorai, the privileging of the Neo-Confucian element within the Confucian tradition 
was wrong; for that legitimated  a subversive individual subjectivity at the expense of institutions.. 
Let us now move forward nearly a hundred years and turn to the Kansei reform itself and its 
treatment of the sekiten ritual. We shall approach it through the thinking of its main promoter and 
driver, Matsudaira Sadanobu.
The Kansei reform and Matsudaira Sadanobu
The Kansei reform began with the appointment of Matsudaira Sadanobu to the Senior 
Council (rôjû 老中 ) in the 6th month of 1787. It lasted effectively until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Though Sadanobu himself resigned early, he, together with his close associates, 
is generally recognized as the driving force behind the whole reform. A symbolic terminal date is 
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the performance of the autumn  sekiten ritual in the rebuilt Shôheizaka Sage’s Hall (Seibyô 聖廟 ) 
in 1800. The reform had many aspects, including financial retrenchment and recovery of the 
Bakufu finances.  But from the perspective of today’s talk the most important element was initially 
and immediately a movement to encourage, revitalize and discipline the samurai spirit of martial 
arts and academic learning, particularly among Bakufu feudal retainers. From the start, 
Sadanobu’s campaign had a highly disciplinarian tone. To borrow the words of Ishakawa Ken 石川
謙 : ‘It might be more appropriate to call it coercion rather than encouragement’.＊11  Morohashi 
Tetsuji 諸橋轍次 and R.P. Dore see the reform as a search for intellectual unity or conformity 
within the samurai community, a desideratum, it may be mentioned, of Sorai himself. The chief 
vehicle for achieving moral regeneration among the samurai retainers of the Bakufu was 
Confucianism.  Here, among competing schools, including Sorai’s, the reformers decided 
decisively in favor of Song Neo-Confucianism. The Confucianism of the Kansei reform was from 
1790, through the ‘Prohibition on heterodoxy’, officially exclusively, Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism. 
More particularly, most of the senior Confucianists in the Bakufu College belonged to the Kimon 
崎門 school of Yamazaki Ansai,山崎闇斎 (1618-82) or were in some way associated with it. But 
Matsudaira Sadanobu himself also lectured to his vassals on Confucian ethics. His homilies drew 
on Neo-Confucian metaphysics, but are marked by an authoritarian tone. It is clear that his 
authoritarianism took the form of a desire to dominate and control men’s minds, to direct them to 
right moral conduct.. 
As the driving figure behind the reform, Sadanobu left the imprint of his character on the 
Kansei sekiten, as had Tsunayoshi in a quite different direction on the Genroku ceremony.  He does 
not appear directly to have left any sustained discussion of  the question of  sekiten observance in 
Japan in his copious writings. However, like his seventeenth century distant kinsman Tokugawa 
Mitsukuni 徳川光圀 (1628-1700), he revealed articulate assumptions from a ruler’s perspective 
about Confucianism and Confucian practice in Japan that bear on the problem. Let us now glance 
at the thinking of this  remarkable and powerful young man, only 28 when appointed to the Bakufu 
Senior Council (rôjû 老中 ). 
Sadanobu is well known for his apparent inconsistencies. In his thought there are to be found 
expressed, in all their contradictariness,  most of the intellectual currents of his day, so that it reads 
like a paradigm of the intellectual world of late eighteenth-century Japan. These attitudes 
co-existed in his mind with little obvious consciousness of any inherent conflict, a position that 
might have strained a more synthetic or systematic mind. A recent Japanese study notes that the 
‘greatest characteristic’ of Sadanobu’s ‘manner of thought’ was that ‘he distinguished strictly 
between his views as an individual and his political standpoint as a chief minister’.＊12  . Sadanobu 
was ready, in the interest of moral revival, to impose restrictions on the intellectual life of the 
samurai community that he did not apply to himself or his close associates. Already, we may note, 
this feature of his thinking is redolent of the instrumentality identified in the political thought of 
Sorai himself.
As even such a short sketch suggests, Sadanobu’s own mind was eclectic. Let us summarize 
some of his attitudes, particularly as they bore, directly or indirectly, on the question of observance 
of the sekiten. It will be seen that these attitudes were contradictory,  in effect both positive and 
negative as far as the sekiten  was concerned. On the positive side, first:
1. Sadanobu described himself as a student of the Hayashi. He was conscious of the long 
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association of the Rinke academy with the Tokugawa ruling house. As an intense Bakufu loyalist, 
he would not have wished to see the  sekiten, a conspicuous element of that tradition, fall into 
desuetude.
2. Sadanobu shared in the gathering interest of his contemporaries in the Japanese past. This had 
many facets, including the religious revival of forms of Shinto worship. He himself was something 
of an antiquarian, concerned with preserving and understanding the record of the Japanese past. It 
is possible that this attitude predisposed him favorably to some forms of revivalism such as 
restoring the ancient  Engishiki 延喜式 version of the  sekiten. In that respect, there may have been 
a synergy between Sadanobu’s antiquarianism and with that reading of Sorai’s philosophy that saw 
him as advocating the restoration of an ancient order. 
But rather more ambivalently:
3. He was, as his sermons to his samurai show, drawn to the moral intensity of the Kimon 崎門 
school of Yamazaki Ansai. In fact, this may have influenced his thinking about the ceremony in 
two different ways and in two different directions. First, the ceremony would sacralize and 
legitimate the moral revival that was a major element in the Kansei Reform itself. Sadanobu 
himself lectured on Confucian morality. As claimed earlier,  however, the tone of his lectures was 
disciplinary and prescriptive.  He showed little sympathy for the devotional and soteriological 
objectives, the spiritual rewards, of Song Neo-Confucianism’ behaviour rather than their souls. 
The ethical element of Neo-Confucianism, particularly perhaps its emphasis on self-denying 
loyalty,  met this need admirably. Put tritely, he was more concerned with their behaviour than 
their souls. However, in a different direction, Kimon tradition was also suspicious of the worship of 
Confucius as a foreigner, and Asami Keisai 浅見絅斎 (1652-1711) among Ansai’s disciples wrote 
an essay condemning unofficial worship of Confucius in Japan, ‘Hi sekiten saku’ 批釋奠策 .＊13   To 
the extent that Sadanobu was influenced by Kimon teaching, this may have inhibited his 
enthusiasm for the ceremony. 
And working negatively to deter Sadanobu from promoting the ceremony:
4. He was widely read in Chinese history and illustrated much of his writing with Chinese, rather 
than Japanese, examples, but Sadanobu was also something of a Sinophobe. He feared what he 
saw as the debilitating and softening influence of China on the martial spirit of samurai. Too 
enthusiastic a worship of Confucius and the civil values that he symbolized might be harmful.
5. In the same direction, but on the religious side, Sadanobu seems to have had serious doubts on 
the efficacy or even the propriety of worshipping Confucius in Japan. These doubts resulted in 
what may have been among the most egregious of his inconsistencies. Even as he promoted the 
liturgical reform of the  sekiten in Edo, he altogether banished the worship of Confucius in the 
domain school of his own fief school in Shirakawa. Confucius himself was not represented on the 
altar of this school, the Rikkyôkan 立教館 ; rather the Sun Goddess was the central object of 
veneration. It will be necessary to refer to this most startling instance of his inconsistency again in 
the conclusion of this talk.＊14 
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6. In his own domain, Sadanobu preferred to emphasize indigenous tradition. He instituted a ritual 
called ‘The festival of military preparedness’ (Bubisai  武備祭 ) from 1784. This seems to have 
been designed as a military counterpart to and perhaps even substitute for the civil  sekiten. It was, 
like the  sekiten, held in the second and eighth months, but on the memorial day to the domain 
founder, Matsudaira Sadatsuna.  Thus one is tempted to say that in place of Confucian 
universalism and civil values,  Sadanobu stressed domain particularism and military values. 
7. Sadanobu was deeply influenced by the political example of his grandfather, the eighth shogun, 
Tokugawa Yoshimune and by Yoshimune’s Kyôhô 享保 reform. But Yoshimune himself, as 
already remarked, had been indifferent to the ceremony; indeed he had withdrawn some of the 
funding located by Tsunayoshi. He had not once attended the ceremony or visited the Hayashi 
Confucian shrine.
8. Together with these competing ideas and attitudes in Sadanobu’s mind, the most profound 
influence on  his ‘public’ thinking has been recognized as the political thought of Ogyû Sorai. A 
recent study summarizes his thought as having ‘a strong Setchû-ha 折衷派 coloring on a basis of 
Sorai-gaku’.＊15  By his own confession, Sorai’s Taiheisaku 太平策 was favorite reading. This text 
may have bolstered his strong sense of mission as a reformer intervening in a period of cyclical 
extravagance and dynastic decline, together with a sense of this intervention as properly based on 
political  ‘techniques’.  Basic to Sadanobu’s thinking, as to Sorai’s, was a utilitarian approach to 
learning. Learning, the study of Confucianism and other forms of knowledge ,was valuable 
instrumentally for promoting political objectives. Indeed, Sadanobu’s  apparent contradictions and 
inconsistencies can, albeit facilely, be reconciled by the one criterion of utility. Practices, morality 
and institutions were to be employed not for what might be thought of as their epistemological 
truth or mutual consistency, but for their practical value in promoting an ordered and safe realm of 
Japan. Even Sadanobu’s ethical intensity can be so subsumed. As the American scholar Herman 
Ooms puts it: ‘This view of ethics as a manipulative device . . . was a transposition of Sorai’s view 
of the political structure as a means to maintain social order’.＊16  Just so, as already remarked, 
Sadanobu seems little interested in the Neo-Confucian analalogue to Buddhsit enlightenment. Like 
Sorai, Sadanobu believed in the efficacy of institutional controls; law, and the fear that it should 
arouse among ‘the lower people’, was a necessary element in political control. Complementary to 
this form of control was the need for unity, a theme of Sorai’s thought and generally identified as a 
motivation in the reform and, of course, in the ‘Prohibition’. Concomitant also was a conviction 
that control over intellectual life must remain with the political elite. This found expression in a 
belief in the necessity of a Sorai-type authoritarian suppression of individual intellectual autonomy 
among all except the governing elite. 
How did these complex and contradictory attitudes influence Sadanobu’s approach to the 
question of the ritual worship of Confucius? Sadanobu’s response to the problem presented by the 
reform must be inferred from the reform itself. It is perhaps necessary to note that though 
Sadanobu had left office by this time, the reform of the cult of Confucius was supervised by his 
close allies Matsudaira Nobuakira  松平信明 (1763-1817) and Hotta Masaatsu 堀田正敦 (1758-
1832). 
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The liturgical reform was cautious and ambivalent, at once conservative in its attempt to 
secure ongoing performance of the rite and restrictive in its apparent attempt to limits its appeal 
and influence.  Indeed, in its disregard of consistency and its political design, it is tempted to call it 
a form of domestic realpolitik. It is not difficult to see why. To sum up the previous discussion: 
preservation of the status quo with respect to the ceremony itself was a necessary 
acknowledgement of the tradition that Sadanobu, himself intensely loyal to the Bakufu and to 
Tokugawa tradition, valued, sought to strengthen and used to legitimate his reform. Liturgical 
recognition of  of venerands symbolic  of the moral revival that was an aim of the reform was also 
surely desirable. At the same time, enhancement of the  sekiten would counter the reformers’ 
declared admiration for the frugal style of Yoshimune; it might also promote ideals of conduct that 
Sadanobu wished to counter, leading to an over-emphasis on  civil rather than military values; it 
might  legitimate the expression of  subjective opinions or what he considered a debilitating 
Sinophilia; or a deflection from the patriotism that Sadanobu wished to foster at a time of 
perceived national peril. Most important from the point of view of the theme of this paper, 
preservation or enhancement of the Rinke status quo might sacralize a version of the tradition that 
Sorai himself had condemned as subversive and destructive of unity; it might, even, be ritually 
improper in the Japanese situation. 
The  sekiten in the reform
To attempt to trace how these ambivalent attitudes worked out in practice, let us now glance 
briefly at the progress of the reform as it affected the cult of Confucius. On appointment to the 
position of  rôjû in 1787, Sadanobu might have been expected to make a symbolic gesture to the 
spiritual aspect of the reform that he now began. After all, it was a traditional Japanese practice at 
moments of radical institutional renovation to invoke supernatural powers; as it were to orient the 
proposed changes to the supernatural world and to seek its sanction.  But perhaps because his 
attitude to the cult of Confucius was so conflicted, Sadanobu in fact left it to the end. The famous 
doctrinal ‘Prohibition of heterodoxy’ came early in the reform, in 1790. Over the following years, 
the Bakufu asserted control over the Confucian academy; the school was taken over by the 
Bakufu from the Hayashi family, and its students officially restricted to retainers. Where hitherto 
the Shôheikô had been a semi-official academy associated with the  Bakufu but open to outsiders, 
it now became official, a school for retainers of the Tokugawa house, established in the name of 
the Shogun himself and funded officially. With that, importantly, came  Bakufu control over 
appointments and procedures. Only slowly, however, did the reformers turn their attention to the 
cult of Confucius. In 1796, the dilapidated Confucian shrine was rebuilt, though this restoration, 
too, had its ambiguities.  The restored building eschewed all color. The result was a structure that 
projected an atmosphere of austerity. 
Last to be addressed was the delayed question of liturgical reform itself. Finally, in 1799, a 
commission, that refuge of the vacillators and the undecided, was appointed to prepare directives 
and diagrams for a reformed ceremony. This commission reported on 1800/i/2; the 
recommendations were handed to the community of ‘Confucian scholars’ on i/13. Most important 
was the commission’s radical first recommendation:
The directives for the next Sekiten will wholly follow the Kaiyuan li  and the Engishiki, with 
allowances made for what is difficult in them in the present.＊17  
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This was indeed a dramatic recommendation. Essentially, if implemented literally, it meant 
rejecting more than a century and a half of Hayashi and Tokugawa tradition and reverting 
decisively to the ancient liturgy of the Heian period. Concomitantly, it would also ignore post-Tang 
developments in the Confucian tradition. Most saliently, it would eliminate the liturgical inclusion 
of figures in the Song Neo-Confucian movement, the tradition embraced by the Hayashi, and, of 
course, adopted as the exclusive orthodoxy underpinning the reform. It would also eliminate 
Mencius and Zi Si. Such a revival, however, was evidently felt to be too radical to be consistently 
applied. After a transitional performance in the spring of 1800, the solution adopted for the first, 
fully reformed, sekiten of that autumn was in effect a compromise: it adopted the  Engishiki 
liturgical form of the ceremony, but retained the traditional Rinke  ‘four correlates’ and the six 
Song Neo-Confucians as venerands. However, the compromise only went so far. After some 
vacillation in the spring, the important invocation, in liturgical terms a high point in the ceremony, 
adopted the wording of the  Engishiki, which did not mention Mencius, Zi Si or the Song Neo-
Confucians at all.  It mentioned by name only Confucius and Yan Hui.
Hail! On the seventh day of the eighth month of the twelfth year of Kansei, the Barbarian-
quelling Generalissimo respectfully sends the Rector of the Academy Hayashi Taira 林衡 of 
the lower fifth rank junior and dares clearly to announce to the Former Sage, the Universal 
Prince of Culture: You, O Prince, were surely vouchsafed by Heaven. When you were born 
your knowledge was innate; you set in order the rites and music; you clearly displayed culture 
and teachings; your abiding merit and bequeathed influence are looked up to for a thousand 
years. Through this, we latter-day students may ‘cleave to benevolence and disport in the 
arts.’＊18  Respectfully, with lengths of silk and with sacrificial victims and wine, with grain 
heaped in various vessels, we reverently serve you according to the ancient procedures; 
according to the the patterns we set forth the pure oblations, with the Former Teacher, Master 
Yan and others as correlates. Please partake.＊19 
In this way, the revived ceremony retained some place for the traditional Rinke Neo-
Confucian scheme; the Confucians who had transmitted Song  Neo-Confucianism, the exclusive 
orthodoxy of the reform,  were represented symbolically; but their names were suppressed from 
the important invocation.
The unsatisfactory, inconsistent nature of this compromise did not go unchallenged. It was 
pointed out by one of the commissioners, a liturgical conservative, Inuzuka Inami 犬塚印南 (1750-
1813),  a student from the pre-reform Hayashi school. He commented at this time  that it was 
wrong liturgically to privilege Yan zi with an invocation addressed to him alone among the four 
correlates and to omit the other three. Inami was in effect pointing to the difficulty of marrying an 
ancient liturgy (with two main venerands: Confucius and 顔回 ) to a modern, changed form of the 
tradition (with one chief venerand, four correlates and six Song dynasty ‘subsidiary venerands’). 
His point would seem to be that the reformed liturgy did not solve this difficulty satisfactorily. It 
did not properly accommodate the four correlates, major figures who reflected post-Tang 
developments in the exegetical and liturgical tradition and of course the beliefs of the Neo-
Confucian orthodoxy. Thus, paradoxically, the reformed liturgy suppressed the liturgical salience 
of, or at least compromised, the very Neo-Confucian tradition that the reformers imposed on the 
academic community as exclusively orthodox. It may well be significant that Inami, himself a 
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former student at the Hayashi academy,  resigned his position in the Bakufu college from the 
autumn of this year. 
The significance of the reform
Granted that it appeared inconsistent and liturgically blemished, what was the significance of 
this adoption of a pre-Neo-Confucian form of the ceremony? I wish to argue that its flawed nature, 
its inbuilt liturgical inconsistency,  reflected in the liturgical mode a profoundly ambivalent 
approach to the cult of Confucius on the part of Sadanobu and his fellow reformers. 
First, in a positive direction, for the leaders of the Kansei reform, the revival of the ancient 
sekiten must have brought certain obvious benefits. In immediate terms, however belatedly and in 
however flawed a manner, the revival of the ceremony formally sanctified the revival of 
Confucianism that had all along been an aim of the reformers. The Confucian project was now 
sacralized in a revived and now official ritual act within an academy funded and sponsored in the 
name of the shogun. The reformed liturgy could also be said to preserve, albeit in a liturgically 
compromised, reduced form, the  symbolic and liturgical deference to the Neo-Confucian tradition 
that was traditional in the Rinke school and  had been declared ‘orthodox’ in the 1790 prohibition. 
For the four correlates and six subsidiary venerands, representative of the line of transmission 
(daotong 道統 ) of Neo-Confucianism, remained, in accordance with Rinke tradition,  represented 
in the ceremony. They received offerings, even if they were no longer named in the invocation. 
The formal commitment of the reform to Song Neo-Confucianism is symbolically preserved, or at 
least not explicitly denied. In broad terms, both Bakufu tradition and the moral basis for the Kansei 
Reform that particularly interested Sadanobu had been protected. But it must be noted that the 
devotional and soteriological  aspect of Neo-Confucianism, symbolized in the Zhu Xi and indeed 
the traditional Rinke ceremony by the liturgical prominence of the Song Neo-Confucian 
venerands, has been weakened by their omission from the invocation. 
In reverting to the ancient Engishiki version, the reformers could also be said to have 
accommodated the trend to Japanese cultural revivalism that was a feature of their world. But there 
were further ideological and political rewards. Matsudaira Sadanobu must surely have intended the 
ceremony to assert the legitimacy of the Bakufu as the heir to Japan’s ancient state. The Engishiki 
liturgy was unambiguously that of a state ritual. In Tang China, whence it was directly adopted, it 
had been performed under the direction of the emperor. It was, as already pointed out, historically 
a rite of the ‘cosmic ordering’ type, associated with a monarchical regime. The shogun’s role as 
prime agent and sponsor of the revived ceremony thus symbolically consolidated a monarchical 
role within the Japanese polity. Arai Hakuseki, it is tempting to suggest, would not have been 
displeased. The new ceremony also identified the Bakufu with the whole body of ethical thought 
ultimately attributable to Confucius himself. In addition to his explicit military role, like other East 
Asian rulers, the shogun could claim a symbolic civil and moral function. More specifically in 
institutional terms, in appropriating the ancient  Engishiki  and naming the shogun in the 
invocation as the ultimate agent of the ritual and as the sponsor of the new shrine, the revived 
ceremony symbolically proclaimed the new Bakufu College, site of the ceremony,  as a national 
institution, successor to the ancient institution of the Daigakuryô 大学寮 , the national institute for 
the education of officials in ancient Japan. It also associated the military regime, with the shogun 
at its head, with one of the periods of Japanese history celebrated for ‘good government’. Thus the 
‘cosmological ordering’ version of the rite enjoyed a restoration in the service of legitimating the 
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Tokugawa Bakufu at a time of perceived national difficulty. 
At the same time, however, now in a negative direction, revival of the Engishiki  version of 
the ceremony acted in a subtle way to isolate the ceremony under strict  Bakufu  control. To 
understand how this restriction and isolation were effected, it is necessary to be reminded of the 
historical nuances of the version of the sekiten now revived.  The Engishiki sekiten consisted of 
two discrete parts: a ‘pre-dawn celebration’ (mimeisai 未明祭 ) a religious ceremony and a sequel 
under the heading of ‘exposition and discussion’ (kôron 講論 ). The ‘pre-dawn celebration’ 
constituted the central religious part of the ceremony; it was held in the shrine itself (byô 廟 ) and 
consisted of offerings, libations and invocations addressed to Confucius and Yan Hui. However, 
this was an intra-mural ceremony, with attendance and participation historically restricted to the 
professional staff of the academy, not high ranking within the ancient court hierarchy, and by 
students, rather than the high nobility. 
This religious ceremony had been followed by an elaborate and more socially inclusive 
sequence, a lecture, feasting and reading of poetry and other functions, held in the lecture hall of 
the Daigakuryô. In contrast to the mimeisai, this second part of the ceremony was attended by the 
high court nobility, and provision was even made for the attendance of the crown prince. Thus the 
Engishiki sekiten had involved a wide spectrum of the polity. But it did so in a bifurcated manner; 
the religious ceremony itself, arguably by far the more important component for the Confucian 
cult, involved only the academic institutions and their staff and official students. It reflected a 
stage in the evolution of the ancient Japanese sekiten at which the religious core of the rite had 
become largely divorced from the concerns and participation of the imperial family or the higher 
oligarchic bureaucracy. 
Of the Engishiki liturgy, however, the Kansei reform revived only the intra-mural ‘predawn 
celebration’. It wholly abandoned verse composition and feasting that had been so popular during 
the patronage of the fifth shogun. In some sense, it was a reduced, even ‘minimalist’ celebration. 
To borrow the words of Inuzuka Inami,  the writer of the Shôhei shi 昌平志 , ‘Whatever was 
concerned with empty ornament was abandoned’.＊20   The historical resonance of this was 
profound indeed.  In stripping the ceremony of its cultural and esthetic allurements, the Kansei 
sekiten had followed the model of Yoshimune’s retrenchment. But it had also reverted to its 
historical Engishiki roots in more, simply, than its outward liturgical form. It revived also the 
socially and politically sequestered aspect of the ancient religious ceremony proper. Like the 
ancient mimeisai, the Kansei revival directly involved only relatively low-ranking Confucian 
specialists and a student body drawn from the hatamoto 旗本 and gokenin  御家人 among the 
Bakufu vassal corps.＊21  Just as in ancient Japan, the career prospects of students in the university 
had been little changed by their studies, so also the sons of  hatamoto and  gokenin  stood to gain 
little, except modest prizes, themselves differentiated by inherited rank, from their Neo-Confucian 
studies at the Bakufu College. 
Thus the ceremony did not sacralize Confucian values in the whole Tokugawa bureaucratic 
community; it did not transform the values informing or articulating the structure of the Tokugawa 
state as a whole; it did not seriously challenge the deep-rooted ascription of samurai society. The 
point can be more broadly summarized as follows: despite certain gestures towards the Chinese 
structure of a meritocratic bureaucracy such as the introduction of an examination system, the 
Kansei educational reform, symbolized by the reformed liturgy of the sekiten, challenged the 
existing system at best superficially. Like the society of the time of the Engishiki, Tokugawa 
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samurai society remained largely hereditarily and ascriptively determined. As in ancient Japan, 
though now under the control of a far more authoritarian system of government, education did not 
provide a path to the highest office. In that sense, the ceremony and the symbolic figure of 
Confucius is unlikely to have engaged the aspirations of the students within the academic 
community; or if it did so, it was as a remote and unattainable ideal.
The question of Sorai’s influence
Revival of the ancient Engishiki ceremony was restrictive in another subtle and important 
way that may reflect the influence of Ogyû Sorai. The Engishiki liturgy reflects an early, pre-Neo-
Confucian form of the Confucian tradition. It belonged to the ‘cosmological ordering’ phase of 
ritual development as already discussed. We have noted the subtle  liturgical disprivileging of 
Mencius, Zi Si and the representatives of the Song Neo-Confucian revival in the Kansei revived 
version. These figures, however, represent the tradition within Confucianism that most privileges 
individual subjectivity, that aspect of contemporary Confucian practice that had most aroused the 
polemical reflexes of Ogyû Sorai. It is not fanciful to see their liturgical demotion as an 
accommodation of the influence from Sorai. Influence in intellectual history is, of course, often 
difficult to demonstrate. In the present case, evidence is in the main indirect. It is general and 
diffuse, to do with the intellectual climate of the time and influences on the thinking of the main 
actors in the reform; but it is also focussed on the detail of the liturgy itself. 
First, there can be little doubt that Sorai’s thought influenced the general intellectual climate 
of the Reform and with that, the choices of its implementers, chiefly of Sadanobu. In view of the 
fact that the Kansei ‘Prohibition’ is often said to be aimed against Sorai’s school, it is useful to be 
reminded that the influence of Sorai was twofold: towards the ‘private domain’ of ‘poetry 
literature and history’ in one direction and, in the other, ‘maintaining order in the state and peace 
in the world’.＊22  The declared target of the reformers was the frivolity that they associated with the 
former. Sorai’s influence with regard to the conduct of administration, however, was more subtle 
and profound. It surely determined little less than the overall weltschaung in which the liturgical 
reform was embedded. Historians indeed seem to agree that Sorai’s early eighteenth-century 
assault on Zhu Xi metaphysics changed the intellectual climate for the remainder of the Tokugawa 
period, to the disadvantage of the traditional Zhu Xi school.  Sagara Tôru, for instance, sees the 
reform as an unsuccessful attempt to recover power by Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianists discredited and 
disprized of influence by the spread of Sorai learning. For Sagara, Zhu Xi Confucianism had lost 
its authority and no longer had the strength to lead the world of thought. Of the Kansei prohibition 
itself, he writes, ‘we can see the reality of the decline of the Confucian movement’. The 
prohibition on heterodoxy, was a play for power: an ‘attempt to recover its social power by the 
followers of Zhu Xi Confucianism’. It was not a grass-roots movement, but ‘depended on 
admonition, surveillance, and discipline.’＊23 
Sagara’s view of the reform as authoritarian and  by resurgent Zhu Xi scholars, when set 
beside the analysis of Sadanobu’s thinking as profoundly influenced by Sorai, suggests the 
paradox with which this lecture started out.  It is Maruyama Masao who directly and with greatest 
insight confronts the paradox of thinkers influenced by Sorai espousing the Zhu Xi metaphorical 
theories that Sorai himself condemned. ‘Sorai’s enormous intellectual influence’, he writes, was 
more often demonstrated in the thought of his opponents than in that of his followers.’＊24   For 
Maruyama, this influence found expression in the discrediting of the Zhu Xi belief in the ‘natural’ 
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character of Confucian morality. In his view, the prohibition on heterodoxy was reactionary,  ‘in 
effect an attempt at a compulsory revival of the ideology of natural order. It was an attempt to 
impose feudal standards as a natural law by force, when they had already lost such self-evident 
validity’.＊25
Exactly so.  It is possible to apply Maruyama’s insight to the reform of the liturgy of the 
ceremony  and to see in the manner of implementation of the reform and the prohibition an 
expression of precisely the utilitarian view of political authority, the realpolitik,  that is 
characteristic of Sorai’s thought in practice. In this view, inconsistencies such as were displayed 
by Sadanobu did not, in themselves,  matter in principle. It did not  matter that the Song 
metaphysical creed had suffered discredit in the eyes of many or most. As long as beliefs and 
practices were perceived to be instrumentally conducive to the end of contentment or good 
governance and stability, they were acceptable; their mutual consistency was not an issue. So the 
general climate of intellectual life in the Kansei period was probably receptive to instrumental and 
authoritarian interventions. Sorai of course advocated ‘unity’, suppression of individual subjective 
opinions. Sadanobu’s bold appropriation of the sekiten in the name of the shogun can be 
understood as, in part at least, a pre-emptive move to monopolize control over the Confucian 
tradition at the sacral level, just as the ‘prohibition’ aimed to control Confucian knowledge at the 
level of ideology. Sadanobu’s simultaneous revival and paring down of the ceremony, his seeming 
desire to  preserve it but at the same time to make in unattractive and austere, again are best 
interpreted as politically motivated attempt to honor Tokugawa tradition but at the same time to 
restrict and control the influence of certain aspects of Confucianism. 
Circumstantial evidence
But it is possible to go further in the same direction, and to see several features of the 
liturgical reform in terms of Sorai’s influence. Sorai seems to have been associated in the minds of 
contemporaries with restorationism, or ‘return to the past’. The Engishiki liturgy, as we have 
emphasized,  reflects an early, pre-Neo-Confucian form of the Confucian tradition. Moreover, put 
in terms of Catherine Bell’s typology of ritual, the Engishiki represented a ritual of the ‘cosmic 
ordering’ type. In its original form, its scope was the cosmos and the polity and its ruler; it did not 
symbolically address the ‘ethico-moral’ conduct of the individual follower of the way.  Such a 
ritual resonated well with Sorai’s own beliefs. Recall that Sorai himself did not believe that moral 
self regeneration was a concern of the individual in the Confucian tradition as properly understood. 
The original  Engishiki version, rather than the ‘ethical-moral’  Zhu Xi version however much 
adapted,  would have appealed to Sorai on these grounds.
Sorai’s views on the liturgy of the ceremony itself may also have influenced the reformers. 
That Sorai’s criticism of the ‘presumption’ of later  sekiten practice  was understood and 
influential is attested late in the period by Nakatani Unkan 中谷雲漢 (1812-75), a scholar of the 
Sorai school.  Unkan, writing of the sekiten in connection with the ceremony proposed for the 
Amagasaki 尼崎 domain, endorsed Sorai’s criticism of the ‘presumptuous arbitrariness and 
nonsense’ of the Tang, Song and later practice of awarding and taking away ‘titles of nobility, 
posthumous titles, and rankings’ to ‘several tens’ below Confucius and Yan Hui in the context of 
the  sekiten.＊26  Thus it is indeed not fanciful to suggest that Sadanobu, in turning to  Engishiki 
with its shorter list of venerands,＊27  believed that he was following a Sorai preference. In so doing, 
he may have believed that he was also doing something to suppress the potentially subversive 
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‘subjectivity’ that was anathema both to Sorai and to Sadanobu himself.
There is further interesting, albeit again circumstantial and analogical, evidence that Sorai’s 
views on the liturgy of the  sekiten  may have influenced the decision to revive the ancient liturgy 
during this period. This evidence comes from the feudal provinces, beyond the Bakufu College. It 
seems that, in domain schools, a Sorai school affiliation may have deterred Confucians from 
sekiten liturgies that venerated Mencius, Zi Si and the Song subsidiary venerands. At Hirosaki 弘前
, under Tsugaru Nobuharu 津軽信明 (1762-91), the eighth daimyo, a strong admirer of Sorai, the 
Tang version of the ceremony was used and only Confucius and Yan Hui mentioned in the 
invocation.  In Hiroshima, the  Kimon scholar Rai Shunsui 頼春水 (1748-1816)  defeated the Sorai 
scholar Kagawa Nanpin 香川南浜 (1734-92) in a factional dispute, to establish Zhu Xi learning as 
the domain’s orthodoxy. The defeated Nanpin died in 1792, but  Sorai learning was perpetuated in 
the private setting of his Shûgyôdô 修業堂 by scholars of his persuasion. In what must surely have 
been a deliberate gesture, they venerated only ‘the former sage and former teacher’ [sc. Confucius 
and Yan Hui]. Similar linkage of Sorai affiliation with exclusion of the four correlates and Song 
venerands is  to be seen in the domain schools in the Shônai 庄内 , Tawara 田原 and Izushi 出石 
domains. Conversely, aggressively Kimon or Zhu Xi schools tended, unsurprisingly, to include 
representatives of the Song school among their venerands. To mention just a handful only, the 
domains schools in Shibata 新発田 , Tsuwano 津和野 , Kagoshima 鹿児島 (where the Sorai school 
was dismissed in favour of Zhu Xi as a result of a factional dispute) all listed Song scholars among 
their venerands; all were Ansai affiliated or had relations with the publicly Zhu Xi Bakufu College. 
In the light of this evidence, it is again not fanciful to suggest that the Kansei reform of the 
sekiten owes its peculiar, and it has to be said, blemished  and paradoxical form to the influence of 
Sorai. This influence was thus both of a general and diffuse type: the background acidic eating 
away of the persuasiveness of the Zhi Xi understanding of the world and its substitution by a 
utilitarian approach toward governance and, with that also, to an instrumental view of  the world of 
religious practice. This allowed the manipulative adoption of a cultic practice not so much for 
reasons of belief, but for the instrumental and disciplinary ends. But secondly, Sorai’s influence 
seems likely to have extended to the level of liturgical choice and detail, to the adoption of an 
ancient, and in terms of the contemporary Confucian tradition, anachronistic, liturgy.  That liturgy 
disprivileged elements of the tradition that the reformers, even as they proclaimed them orthodox, 
also sensed to be potentially subversive and wished to keep under control.
Conclusion: anthropological perspectives
How successful was the reform of the ceremony? After the reform, the religious cult of 
Confucius seems to have continued to play a regular part in the life of the post-reform academic 
community of the Bakufu College. There is no reason to doubt that certain among the Bakufu 
College community, its professional Confucianists and liturgists, were committed and sincere. 
None the less, the ceremony features little in the extant documentation of the College. Like the 
ancient  ‘Pre-dawn celebration’ mimeisai, it seems to have become taken for granted and recedes 
from the foreground of College matters. There is no evidence that it flourished. A directive of 1807 
addressed a problem of talking during rehearsals. The official record of observance also suggests 
flagging interest and depleted liturgical energy. The main source is Zoku Tokugawa jikki 続徳川実
記 . According to the research of Sudô Toshio 須藤敏夫 , during the 67 years up till the Restoration 
there were 87 observances and 48 suspensions ; of these, a ‘considerable number’ are for ‘no 
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identifiable reason’.＊28  The ceremony is said to have become gradually formalized and 
perfunctory. Certainly, the lack of evidence concerning the ceremony in this final phase suggests a 
fading of perceived importance. Nor is this decline surprising. 
Certainly, reasons external to the ceremony itself played a part in the decline of the sekiten. 
The Bakumatsu national crisis, summarized in the locution naiyû gaikan 内憂外患 , may, of course, 
have made traditional Neo-Confucian  approaches to social and political problems seem bookish. 
The full history for the worship of Confucius in the Bakumatsu period has yet to be written. But it 
would seem likely that academic Confucianism, especially perhaps of the Zhu Xi variety, failed to 
engage the commitment of intellectuals and the younger, more dynamic samurai. Attention shifted 
to more compelling questions of national crisis and survival and to orientation to a new and 
dangerous world..
But there were also causes intrinsic to the ceremony itself that are worth exploring. Here, 
anthropological views of ritual may be illuminating, though caution is required when applying 
such theory cross-culturally to Japan. According to the theory of Victor Turner, one of the 
functions of ritual is to create a sense of ‘communitas’, symbolically to resolve tensions within the 
community. At the same time, these tensions also provide the dynamism that drives the 
performance and inspires its participants. It was that tension that informed the great  sekiten  for 
the crown prince in the  Chinese DaTang Kaiyuan li version of the rite, in which autocratic 
imperial power was symbolically and ritually reconciled with bureaucratic rationalism. There, 
‘both imperial and academic participants in the rite unite in an act of homage to the founder of the 
tradition of learning on which the bureaucracy itself depends for its training, identification of 
merit, selection and the very moral and political ideals that, in the ideal order of things, inform the 
whole polity.’＊29 
But if this ‘resolution of conflict’ theory of the function of ritual has any truth, the Kansei 
version of the rite no longer effectively performed the function of creating communitas from 
tensely related elements participating in the ritual. Despite its formal links to the Bakufu, the 
Kansei  sekiten was an intramural and inward-looking rite. Despite its acknowledgment of the 
patronage of the shogunate, it kept political power at arm’s length. Its chief officers were 
professional Confucianists, rather than, as in imperial China, active participants in the wider 
bureaucracy. The liturgy addressed no serious conflict of interest within the polity; the lives of the 
participant were already largely ascriptively determined before entering  the academy and 
participating in its ritual. That ceremony derived no dynamism from its institutional setting, since 
the Bakufu college  delivered no substantial rewards in terms of career rewards for its students. 
The Confucius whom it venerated was not a powerful cultural force in the larger community. For 
these reasons internal to its structure, and social and political setting, it is not surprising that the 
Kansei  sekiten ran out of energy and conviction.
Application of general models of ritual suggests other features of the Kansei  sekiten  that 
may have further compromised its efficacy and energy. As the historians Ishikawa Ken, Sagara 
Tôru and others noted, the Kansei reform was coercive in spirit. In the expansive claim of 
Maruyama Masao already quoted, the Kansei reform was ‘an attempt to impose feudal standards 
as a natural law by force when they had already lost such self-evident validity’. It aroused 
widespread resentment. Like the prohibition on heterodoxy,  the Kansei sekiten was imposed. It is 
unlikely to have been rooted in or reflected the aspirations of the whole society or of many beyond 
a small, if in themselves interesting, coterie of professional Confucian scholars and liturgists. In 
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contrast to China, there was no large constituency of men motivated by aspiration to high office or 
to whom the liturgical recognition of Confucius and his followers was in any way compelling. In 
the Japanese society, this now austere ceremony, shorn of its erstwhile cultural glamour, may well 
have seemed tainted by the coercive aspect of the reform as a whole.  
But coercion is seen as inimical to successful ritual. It is here that Sorai’s authoritarian 
utilitarianism becomes relevant, but may also subvert what it seeks to promote. For, particularly 
from Sadanobu’s point of view, the reformed sekiten was a Sorai-type device. It needed power or 
some form of coercion to be sustained.  To quote the  anthropologist Roy Rappaport, ‘[S]anctity, 
itself the foundation of the true and the correct, and the numinous supporting it, become false 
when they are subordinated to the powerful, for they falsify consciousness.  But the cost is great 
even for those who are not deluded. For them, ritual becomes empty and meaningless.＊30
Furthermore, the revivalist nature of the reformed ceremony may have created unease for 
some. In opting for an unadapted archaic and anachronistic version of the liturgy, the reformers 
gained some obvious ideological benefits, as discussed above. But they were in effect embracing a 
form of liturgical fundamentalism, ‘the literal interpretation of highly specific texts and the 
granting to them of absolute authority’.＊31  The choice, it was suggested, was partly inspired by 
Sorai-type restorationism, by a desire to filtre out, or to de-emphasize, problematic aspects of the 
ceremony, combined with a fashionable nativist nostalgia for the Japanese past. Such 
fundamentalism, however, can create problems of disjunction with the present. It ‘sometimes 
exposes the sacred, itself the ground of conventional truth, to general invalidation, falsification, or 
at least high dubiety.’＊32   The revival of an ancient ‘cosmic ordering’ type of rite carried the 
danger of remoteness. Quite literally, the revived Engishiki  backstaged those interpreters of the 
tradition, Mencius and others who had rendered it personally meaningful and empowered 
individual followers  to act as independent moral agents within their own society. In this, the 
reformed Kansei sekiten, reflects Sadanobu’s  own authoritarian interest in controlling men’s 
minds, in disciplinary Neo-Confucian ethics, rather than Neo-Confucian spirituality. 
Considerations of power and instrumentality refer back once again and finally to the question 
of the place of belief. First, there is the question of general acceptance of the Confucian, or Neo-
Confucian, world view in the samurai society of the time. As a ritual, the  sekiten projected a world 
view. To borrow the language of Roy Rappaport again, it articulated and acted out a  logos, a 
world view that was a ‘true, moral, eternal, harmonious, encompassing unitary order’.＊33  Here, 
participation in the ‘liturgical order’ may constitute ‘a public acceptance of a public order’.＊34 
But belief, rather than mere acceptance,  is also necessary for the long term health of a ritual.  ‘[A] 
liturgical order that is not supported by the conviction of at least some of the members of the 
congregations realizing it is in danger of gradually falling into desuetude’.＊35  Even within a 
religious tradition as pluralistic as that of East Asia, here may have been problems for samurai in 
committing themselves to belief in  a Confucian vision of the world. 
Sadanobu’s blatant inconsistency, his manifestly instrumental view of ritual, a legacy of 
Sorai, and his refusal to enact the sekiten in his own school, precisely the ground on which the 
Confucian tradition sanctioned such performance, must surely have further weakened the cogency 
of the ceremony in the minds of contemporaries. It laid the ceremony  open to the suspicion that it 
was merely an expedient exploitation of religious belief (or in Sadanobu’s case perhaps even 
disbelief) for a perceived social need, or, in extreme terms, a ‘lie’.  It could be discarded or 
adopted at will. No doubt Sadanobu would have protested that different social groups,  Bakufu 
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retainers, potential holders of government bureaucratic office on the one hand  and domain 
samurai on the other, fulfilled different functions and that it was therefore  appropriate that they 
should worship at different altars. However, where religions with a claim to universality are 
concerned, such recourse to what amounts to a kind of  ‘situational ethics’ runs the risk of 
subverting religious authority.  Put differently, Sadanobu’s own Rikkyôkan altar arrangement, 
banishing any representation of the person of Confucius, placed the native cult above the cult of 
Confucius, and so displaced it as the ultimate locus of sanctity. Though the Bakufu College was a 
different constituency, this could only weaken the authority of the cult in Edo. Here, it is tempting 
to claim, Sorai’s utilitarianism and instrumental approach to ritual became ultimately self-
defeating.  Roy Rappaport warns that ‘[a] liturgical order that is not supported by the conviction of 
at least some of those realizing it at least some of the time has become, as we say, “mere ritual”, 
and is likely soon to pass away. Its gods, banished from eternity, disappear into the past’.＊36  This, 
of course, was not yet the situation for Confucianism at the time of the Kansei reform. But there 
were many straws in the wind. Its leading promoter held inconsistent views about its propriety; the 
ceremony was shorn of its social and cultural attractions; participation was limited to a relatively 
small sub-community; its symbols were remote from the lives and expectations  of ordinary 
Bakufu vassals; and its liturgy was unsettlingly blemished by significant inconsistency. It is little 
wonder that the ceremony faltered.
Let us finish with a valedictory account of the Bakufu College sekiten of autumn, 1866, 
described as the final Hayashi observance of the ceremony in the Tokugawa period.＊37  The 
observer was Takahashi Katsuhiro 高橋勝弘 , in his youth a student in the broader community of 
the College, whose own private pupil status had excluded him from participation, and who had had 
to obtain special  permission to attend.
What seemed so very strange was the attire of the Hayashi and the other students. The 
Hayashi wore strangely colored Chinese clothes, with something like short pantaloons 
(kohakama 小袴 ; they carried maces (shaku 笏 ) and wore black wooden shoes; the 20 or 30 
teachers and students all had blue long-sleeved robes referred to as hoi 布衣 ; and they had 
little hats on their heads. For the offerings, they used the so-called ho 簠 , ki 簋 , hen 籩 and tô 
豆 [ritual vessels]. They were all raising these a little below eye level, and the Rector of the 
University raised his mace and led the way in ascending and descending [the steps]. I suppose 
that was to lead the students in the performance of the rite. The slowness of his gait, evocative 
of an age of peace, was calm; it was slower than the walking of an ox. Raise one step; lower 
one step; there was time enough between. The ‘bowing, yielding precedence and moving 
from one position to another’＊38  (yûjô shûsen 揖譲周旋 ) were very respectful. I do not know 
how many times the Rector of the College ascended and descended to the Hall of Great 
Accomplishment. It must be what they call the ritual of nine offerings (kyûken 九献 ).
This ritual has existed in our country from the height of the imperial court on down and has 
been performed in the Ashikaga school. It is a ceremony eleven hundred years old, but this 
time was the final performance. While I was observing it, I was in a trance and felt as though 
I was in my very self travelling in Queli 闕里 [Confucius’ birthplace] and attending on the 
Former Sage, Former Teacher and 72 disciples. Overcome with a reverent wonder, I lingered, 
unable to tear myself away.＊39 
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The tone is valedictory. In Takahashi’s eyes the ritual is exotic and alien. It has become a 
nostalgic spectacle, with little practical relevance to the present. As was to happen shortly to the 
image of Confucius himself, it was essentially a museum piece.  It had become a ‘mere ritual’.
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